

prevent additional insurgents from re-informing the Arghandab region.

This will not be just a clearing operation.

It will be a clear and hold operation, with Afghan National Police, ANP, and the Afghan National Civil Order Police, ANCOP, doing the holding with the Afghan National Army and coalition military police.

As the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Conway, said:

To have American Marines standing on a corner in a key village isn't nearly as effective as having an Afghan policeman or Afghan soldier.

The key to success of a counterinsurgency effort, which is aimed at protecting the people, is winning the support of those people. A significant sign of progress in this respect is that the tips needed about the whereabouts of the Taliban, so essential to defeating them, are coming into the coalition in vastly increasing numbers. An ISAF Strategic Assessment report indicates that there has been increased reporting by local Afghans on the locations of IEDs and weapons caches, resulting in a higher ratio of finds/turn-ins to explosions.

Sixth, the equipping of the Afghan Army is beginning to happen. We authorized the transfer of equipment from Iraq to Afghanistan for the ANA instead of bringing all that equipment back to the United States. We learned that 800 of 1,600 up-armored humvees have arrived in Afghanistan and the rest will soon arrive.

There are other reasons for optimism. We met with the Governor of Kandahar Province and the mayor of the city of Kandahar. Their outspoken opposition to the Taliban and the warlords who have been in power and who recently assassinated the District Governor of Arghandab remains strong and resolute.

Those are some of the signs of progress, but it has come at great cost. We have lost almost 1,200 of our brave troops in Afghanistan, and many times that number wounded. The cost to our treasure has been high. The months ahead will see more casualties, almost all inflicted by IEDs. The strain on our extraordinary troops and their families and on the U.S. civilians in Afghanistan is great. Despite the stress, their morale is high, and regardless of whether one agrees with the mission in Afghanistan, those men and women deserve a tribute from all Americans. We stand in awe of them.

There are also significant threats to the Afghan mission.

The first threat emanates from Pakistan. While Pakistan has taken steps relatively recently to take on some terrorist groups, and has done so at a real cost to the Pakistan Army, they have not taken on a number of groups that use Pakistan as a safe haven, crossing the border into Afghanistan to attack Afghan and ISAF forces, or supplying and supporting those attacks and then returning to the Pakistan safe haven.

Two of those groups are the Haqqani network in the North Waziristan area of the federally administered tribal area, FATA, across the border from eastern Afghanistan, and the home of the Afghan Taliban in Quetta, just across the border from Kandahar.

The State Department maintains a list of foreign terrorist groups. The State Department has said it is currently considering adding the Pakistani Taliban to that list. In my view, the Haqqani network has also long belonged on that list. We would not tolerate such groups attacking us from a neighboring country. Pakistan's failure to attack them, knowing full well, as they do, the location of their headquarters in Miranshah and Quetta, is also intolerable.

A second threat to the success of our Afghan mission is the failure of the Afghan Government to provide noncorrupt, effective government to their people. This has been the subject of much concern. President Karzai's administration and international action on the civilian government side are beginning to stir into long overdue action.

The number of U.S. Government civilians in Afghanistan has tripled since 2009, with a greater percentage in the field outside Kabul.

A third threat to the success of the Afghan mission is the undiminished power of warlords and power brokers and the so-called private security contractors, paid with U.S. taxpayer dollars, who are engaged in bribes and perverse, blatant racketeering and rip-offs.

General Rodriguez, commander, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command and deputy commander, United States Forces—Afghanistan, is determined to protect our convoys from the warlords and their thugs who extort fees for safe passage and often collaborate with the Taliban to create the very threat of insecurity they presumably are hired to guard against.

The Afghan people hate and live in fear of the power brokers and warlords.

They corrupt the local police and are one reason why there is little public confidence in the local police.

Training of more and better local police and the expansion of the Afghan Civil Order Police, ANCOP, are hopeful signs. But the combination of warlords and power brokers operating in effective league with private security contractors, the Taliban, and an often corrupted local police, remain a significant threat to the Afghan mission's success.

The role of Afghan private security contractors, who often have devastating connections to our enemies and who rip off American tax payers, and who are facilitated by the failures of U.S. contractors to adequately vet and oversee their activities, will be the subject of a forthcoming report of a Senate Armed Services investigation.

Fourth, because success of the Afghan mission depends, probably more

than anything else, on the rapid growth and capability of the one nationally respected institution, the ANA, the continuing failure of NATO allies to fill the shortfall of perhaps 2,000 trainers for partnering in the field with Afghan Army and police, so-called operational mentoring and liaison teams, OMLTs, and police operational mentoring and liaison teams, POMLTs, is inexcusable.

Many of our allies, notably the Brits, Canadians, Australians, Poles, Danes, and Georgians have been most admirable in their efforts. But too many NATO allies have failed to make commitments or carry out commitments so important to the success of the first NATO out-of-area combat mission. Continuing pressure on the laggard allies shouldn't be needed—but it is.

The success of the Afghan mission ultimately depends on a political settlement. An approach to the reintegration of those lower level insurgents who can be reintegrated, and the reconciliation with those groups that are not irreconcilable, is underway. The Afghan Government is leading that effort also, as, of course, it must. While our views and experiences in this regard are surely relevant, a brilliant British general leading the ISAF effort in Kandahar reminded us of what T.E. Lawrence said to the British over 100 years ago in a similar situation in a place that is not too far distant from Afghanistan:

Do not try to do much with your own hands. Better (they) do it tolerably than you do it perfectly. It is their war and you are to help them, not to win it for them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions (there), your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is.

Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER OF PROCEDURE

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that on Thursday, July 15, following any leader time, the Senate then resume consideration of the conference report to accompany H.R. 4173, with the time until 11 a.m. equally divided and controlled between Senators DODD and SHELBY or their designees; with the 20 minutes prior to 11 a.m. divided as follows: 5 minutes each in the following order: Senators SHELBY, DODD, MCCONNELL, and REID; that at 11 a.m. the Senate proceed to vote on the motion to invoke cloture on the conference report.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate